Abstract
Introduction
In the recent debates about the impact of Brexit on different policy areas, such as the recent
The UK and the European Union Political Quarterly 87 (2), one under-examined is that of international development assistance. This is surprising, as Britain is generally seen as a highly influential actor in the international development system, a view that has been reinforced in recent years with the increase in foreign aid spending to 0.7% of gross national income (GNI) in 2014, and the ring fencing of the development aid budget from budgetary austerity measures. ii Moreover, international development policy intersects with a very wide range of issues, including security, trade, immigration, climate change and diplomatic
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agendas therefore touch on many strategic concerns.
Development is a long-standing EU foreign policy instrument, regarded in recent years as a European success in which the UK has played a significant role. Indeed, there is evidence that the UK has been able to leverage its membership in the EU to achieve considerable influence.
B EU UK ith implications for financing, policy priorities, and operational functioning. This article concentrates mainly on the issues the UK now faces, and also focuses on what needs to be settled during the Brexit negotiations. It argues that Brexit will reinforce an already obvious UK towards more explicit and expanded focus on UK economic and geopolitical interests. The UK is not alone in this, and similar trends can be found in other EU member states, as well as in the EU itself. The EU gy following the UK exit are therefore contextualised within a broader era of turbulence for development partners. The actual process of disentangling UK development policy from the EU will be comparatively easy, although the UK will have to make key decisions on how much it will want to work together with the EU in the future.
Context
EU development policy is set down in Articles 208 211 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The policy is a shared parallel competence, meaning that member states retain their own development policies, but the European Commission (EC) also manages a common foreign aid budget, in effect acting as a 29 th donor. This common foreign aid budget is made up of a part of the EU budget (under heading 4, Global Europe ), to which all member states have a legal obligation to contribute. In addition, the UK contributes to the European Development Fund (EDF), an extra-budgetary fund focused specifically on financing development assistance for the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP)
countries. The total amount of aid spent by the EC, from both the budget and the EDF, was £8.8bn in 2015 T UK been a significant
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The EC is, however, not just an additional donor. It also has the role of coordinating the activities of the member states through the proposition of rules and norms for member state behaviour, which are then approved by the Council. In the past decade, the EU has promoted rules on increasing aid, making aid more effective, and enhancing cooperation between member states, among others. These rules however are soft: while member states acting in the Council have agreed to adopt these rules, they have no legal obligation to do so, and the EC has very few enforcement tools to push non-compliant members towards adoption/adaptation. The literature finds some compliance, but also evidence of member states cherry picking these rules, adopting the ones which fit their interests while paying lip service to the rest. iii
There has been no academic research to date on exactly how much of this soft law the UK has actually adopted, but many aspects of UK aid policy seem to be aligned with it relatively well.
These include meeting the 0.7% aid/GNI target, prioritising aid to poorer countries and implementing measures to improve the effectiveness and transparency of aid. Indeed, the examine the immediate impacts of the referendum outcome, followed by an exploration of some of the longer term possible implications.
Immediate impacts of the referendum
The results of the referendum on 23 June 2016 had an immediate impact on UK aid, with the fall in the value of the pound leading to considerable pressure on overseas budgets in other currencies. More fundamentally, the decision emboldened the critics of UK aid, and especially the commitment to 0.7% aid/GNI spending. Various opinion polls have shown that a majority entirely possible that as well as re-directing and re-purposing aid to better and more openly serving UK interests (while still claiming to be doing good), that it will be significantly cut. It is possible, however, that exposure to DFID and its work around the world (see below) might P aid serves UK interests, and what the UK would lose out if it was substantially reduced. Whether or not aid allocation is reduced though, she is accelerating and deepening the directions taken by her predecessors to deploy aid to more openly serve UK geoeconomic interests.
Longer term implications of Brexit for UK aid

Impact on UK brand/soft power
The UK primarily through the auspices of DFID wields very considerable soft power in the international development realm. Greening made a point of delivering keynote speeches from the London Stock Exchange, and UK nence in financial services as a tool for development, although whether the UK remains such a high profile donor without the multiplier effect of the EU is difficult to predict.
Implications for UK development policy directions
As noted above, the UK is already moving strongly towards narratives, policies and institutions that elevate economic growth as the engine of development, rather than a focus on poverty reduction per se. While poverty reduction programmes and goals certainly remain important, much of the new energy and investment of the Conservative aid strategy has been in stimulating trade and private sector-led development. Supporters of Brexit insist that Britain will be able to grow its trade with non-EU partners, and it is critical for the May government that it does so. There is a clear narrative that Brexit will accelerate the trend to utilise aid to secure trade deals. xii In this regard, Brexit is likely to strengthen existing policy directions There is an option to increase the volume of aid devoted to business investment. This would fit with the proposal from DFID to increase the support the government can give to CDC, the UK development finance institution from £1.5bn to £6bn. Any spending via CDC must conform 8 to the (current) UK law that international development spending must have the goal of poverty reduction at its core. Given the increased media and political attention on how and where UK aid is spent, CDC spending would be carefully scrutinised but the direction of travel away from (recent) aid is clear.
The UK has been sharply reducing the number of its development partners in the past years, while seeking to its development relationships with strategic partners. This process may end with Brexit, and in fact there may be reasons in some cases for it to reverse. 
Disentangling from EU development policy
T UK nt assistance policy from the EU will be relatively simple, at least compared to other policy areas. As mentioned, most of the legislation in the field is in the form of soft law, and it is likely that the UK conforms only to those aspects that fit its interests anyway. Most of the issues thus UK EU the UK would like to remain involved in funding various aspects of EU development policy, and benefitting from some less visible, but very tangible benefits.
One of these issues EU ACP The EU and the ACP have created formal institutional arrangements for regulating political, economic and development relations with these countries, currently governed by the Cotonou Agreement.
The EU also utilises the EDF, created by the Treaty of Rome, to support development activities in the ACP countries. As mentioned, the fund is EU is replenished by member states every 5 to 7 years.
Essentially, the ACP group is comprised on the former colonies of member states, and institutionalised relationships with them go back to the early 1960s. The special status of this grouping in EU development policy can be seen as somewhat anachronistic, but has it has survived all attempts at reform. It was the accession of the UK in 1973 that actually spurred the states to the existing Yaoundé Conventions into forming a formal negotiating group the ACP. xv This group renegotiated the agreement, leading to the Lomé Conventions, which were superseded by the Cotonou Agreement in 2000, which is set to expire in 2020.
The current, 11 th EDF also runs between 2014 and 2020, and the UK has a legal obligation to during this period. With Brexit currently projected for 2019, the UK might therefore have to contribute to EDF for at least one year after leaving. Also, a significant portion of EDF funds is usually not spent in the given programming period and carried over to the next. Both of these mean that there is a strong possibility that development resources provided by the UK will be allocated without any say from the UK.
Clearly, the UK has a strong stake in how political relations between the Europe and the ACP countries evolve, given that 41 out of the 78 ACP countries are members of the Commonwealth. Negotiations on the successor of the Cotonou Agreement will start in 2018, and the Commission has already laid out its vision on the renewal of the partnership in late 2016. There is a possibility for the UK to remain engaged with EU-ACP relations after Brexit, but it is likely that to get a seat at this table, it will need to commit to contributing to the EDF post 2020.
There are other aspects of EU development policy the UK might opt to remain involved in.
Given that DFID focus on fragile states mirrors that of the EU, the post-Brexit UK will need to consider benefits of working with the EU on police or military missions, including African missions through the Africa Peace Facility as financed through the EDF. Other options, such as bilateral or UN missions, do exist, but the government will need to decide whether the costs, especially in terms of creating new administrative structures outweigh the benefits.
Both Switzerland and Norway contribute to the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, which is essentially an EU effort to use development assistance to reduce migration. The fact that non-EU countries, realising the common European interest, have opted to take part in these, implies that there is a case for the UK to make a similar decision once it would no longer be a member of the EU. The EU has so far set up relatively few trust funds, but it is likely to make greater use of these instruments in the future, and the UK might need to decide on a caseby-case basis whether to contribute to these or not.
A further issue relates to EU aid coordination. As mentioned, the EC does not simply act as a 
Conclusions
The limited attention towards international development policy following the Brexit referendum is partly a reflection of the policy area falling between the stool policy and domestic politics. It is also UK bilateral development policy does not look the way it does because of the EU, and indeed recent policy papers published by DFID rarely contain references to the EU. This also implies that leaving the EU is unlikely to change the major contours of UK development policy, as the EU has had little influence on it in the first place. Brexit will rather reinforce already existing changes driven by the Conservative government towards a greater emphasis on economic growth and British interests.
After Brexit, Britain will remain part of other key forums which set the global development agenda, such as the OECD DAC, where it can make efforts to increase its influence. Also, being outside of the EU does not mean that a constructive dialogue with the integration on development policy matters will not be possible, although there is little precedent for such dialogue with non-EU members. There are areas where such engagement would be in the UK the EU is physically present and implements projects in many countries where DFID has no physical presence, such as the Caucasus, parts of Central Asia, the EU Neighbourhood and some African states. By being an EU member states, the UK can also post national diplomats in these states through the EEAS. T EU UK contribution to its global influence and especially its aid budget with one analysis highlighting that EU iss DFID more than DFID EU , xviii but the UK does lose out on geographical reach of its development budget.
However, the fact that the UK will have until 2019 at the earliest to revisit its development policy means that it needs to start thinking about these issues now not least because this
It is also vital to UK many facets and in the Brexit negotiations there is a risk that this policy will get overlooked.
Yet in aid, trade, climate change and taxation there are important policy decisions to be made.
The interconnection between foreign policy and international development policy will become increasingly important post-Brexit, especially for the UK Brexit involves disentangling the UK from over 40 years of EU membership with the associated policy decisions around immigration and trade policy to environmental and gender policy. It also needs to be ensured that the developing world has a voice in this discussion, as the decision taken on the 23 rd of June 2016 has massive consequences beyond the borders of this island. http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/LSE-Commission/Hearing-7---Britain-as-a-Globalactor-after-BREXIT-REPORT.pdf.
